Characterizing the limit set of PPE payoffs with unequal discounting

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,: Stanford Graduate School of Business

Theoretical Economics, 2015, vol. 10, issue 3

Abstract: We study repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and unequal discounting. We characterize the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs as discount factors converge to 1 with the relative patience between players Â…fixed. We show that the pairwise and individual full rank conditions are sufficient for the folk theorem.

Keywords: Repeated games; unequal discounting; imperfect monitoring; folk theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-10-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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