The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time

Benjamin Bernard () and Christoph Frei ()
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Christoph Frei: Dept. of Math. and Stat. Sciences, University of Alberta

Theoretical Economics, 2016, vol. 11, issue 2

Abstract: We prove a folk theorem for multiplayer games in continuous time when players observe a public signal distorted by Brownian noise. The proof is based on a rigorous foundation for such continuous-time multiplayer games. We study in detail the relation between behaviour and mixed strategies, and the role of public randomization to move continuously across games within the same model.

Keywords: Folk theorem; repeated games; continuous time; imperfect observability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-05-18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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