Ex post implementation in environments with private goods

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,: University of California, Los Angeless
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sushil Bikhchandani

Theoretical Economics, 2006, vol. 1, issue 3, 369-393

Abstract: We prove by construction that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist in a private goods setting with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values. The mechanism shares features with the generalized Vickrey auction of one-dimensional signal models. The construction implies that for environments with private goods, informational externalities (i.e., interdependent values) are compatible with ex post equilibrium in the presence of multi-dimensional signals.

Keywords: Ex post incentive compatibility; multi-dimensional information; interdependent values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-09-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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