Monotonic redistribution of performance-based allocations: a case for proportional taxation

André Casajus ()
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André Casajus: Economics and Information Systems, HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Mangement

Theoretical Economics, 2015, vol. 10, issue 3

Abstract: Within a simple setup, we show that proportional taxation is implied by three properties: efficiency, symmetry, and monotonicity. Efficiency: redistribution has no cost. Symmetry: members of the society with the same performance obtain the same reward after redistribution. Monotonicity: whenever both the performance of a certain member of the society as well as the overall performance of the society do not decrease, then this member's reward after redistribution does not decrease.

Keywords: Redistribution; proportional taxation; efficiency; symmetry; monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-10-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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