Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent

, P. () and , Peyton ()
Additional contact information
, P.: Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
, Peyton: Johns Hopkins University and University of Oxford
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: H. Peyton Young and Dean P. Foster ()

Theoretical Economics, 2006, vol. 1, issue 3, 341-367

Abstract: A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose period-by-period behavior comes arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium behavior in any finite two-person game.

Keywords: Learning; Nash equilibrium; regret; bounded rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-09-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (67)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:199

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