Delay aversion

, () and , A. ()
Additional contact information
,: London Business School
, A.: New York University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Efe Ok

Theoretical Economics, 2007, vol. 2, issue 1, 71-113

Abstract: We address the following question: When can one person properly be said to be more delay averse than another? In reply, several (nested) comparison methods are developed. These methods yield a theory of delay aversion which parallels that of risk aversion. The applied strength of this theory is demonstrated in a variety of dynamic economic settings, including the classical optimal growth and tree cutting problems, repeated games, and bargaining. Both time-consistent and time-inconsistent scenarios are considered.

Keywords: Delay aversion; impatience; consumption smoothing; time consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-03-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: Delay Aversion (2005)
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