 Strategy-proofness and single-crossing, ()
Theoretical Economics, 2009, vol. 4, issue 2 Abstract: This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous, and strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is an extended median rule with n-1 fixed ballots distributed over the individuals' most preferred alternatives. As a by-product, the paper also proves that strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property. It also offers a strategic foundation for the so-called "single-crossing version" of the Median Voter Theorem, by showing that the median ideal point can be implemented in dominant strategies by a direct mechanism in which every individual reveals his true preferences. Keywords: Single-crossing; strategy-proofness; tops-only; peak rules (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:399 Access Statistics for this article Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Federico Echenique, Mira Frick, Pablo Kurlat, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society |
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