Coalition formation under power relations

, () and , ()
Additional contact information
,: Department of Economics, London School of Economics
,: Department of Economics, London School of Economics

Theoretical Economics, 2009, vol. 4, issue 1

Abstract: We analyze the structure of a society driven by power relations. Our model has an exogenous power relation over the set of coalitions of agents. Agents determine the social order by forming coalitions. The power relations determine the ranking of agents in society for any social order. We study a cooperative game in partition function form and introduce a solution concept, the stable social order, which exists and includes the core. We investigate a refinement, the strongly stable social order, which incorporates a notion of robustness to variable power relations. We provide a complete characterization of strongly stable social orders.

Keywords: Power; coalition formation; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D0 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20090001/2288/119 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:447

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Simon Board, Federico Echenique, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().