Markovian persuasion

Ehud Lehrer () and Dimitry Shaiderman ()
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Ehud Lehrer: Department of Economics, Durham University, UK
Dimitry Shaiderman: Faculty of Data and Decision Sciences, Technion–Israel Institute of Technology

Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract: In the classical Bayesian persuasion model, an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. This work extends this classical model to a dynamic setting where the state of nature evolves according to a Markovian law, allowing for a more realistic representation of real-world situations where the state of nature evolves over time. In this repeated persuasion model, an optimal disclosure strategy of the sender must balance between obtaining a high-stage payoff and disclosing information that may have negative implications on future payoffs. We discuss optimal strategies under different discount factors and characterize when the asymptotic value achieves the maximal possible value.

Keywords: Markovian persuasion; dynamic Bayesian persuasion; Markov chain; asymptotic value; absorbing set; homothety (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 D83 K40 M31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08-21
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