Bayesian games with nested information

Royi Jacobovic (), Yehuda Levy and Eilon Solan ()
Additional contact information
Royi Jacobovic: The School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel-Aviv University
Eilon Solan: The School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University

Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract: A Bayesian game is said to have nested information if the players are ordered, and each player knows the types of all players that follow her in that order. We prove that all multiplayer Bayesian games with finite actions spaces, bounded payoffs, Polish type spaces, and nested information admit a Bayesian equilibrium.

Keywords: Bayesian games; nested information; Bayesian equilibrium; selection theorems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08-21
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewForthcomingFile/6461/42662/1 Working paper version. Paper will be copyedited and typeset before publication. (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:6461

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Federico Echenique, Mira Frick, Pablo Kurlat, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().