Catching or Fining Speeders

Eef Delhaye, Stef Proost and Sandra Rousseau

Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2015, vol. 49, issue 3, 415-437

Abstract: This paper uses a political economy model to analyse the choice between fine and detection probability. We distinguish two lobby groups: vulnerable road users and car drivers. If only vulnerable road users are lobbying, we find that the expected fine is higher than if only the interests of car drivers are taken into account. When we consider the choice between detection probability and the fine for a given expected fine, we find that the fine preferred by the vulnerable road users is higher than socially optimal. This theory is empirically tested for the enforcement of speeding in the European Union. © 2015 LSE and the University of Bath

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.catchword.com/cgi-bin/cgi?ini=bc&body=l ... 0150701)49:3L.415;1- (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpe:jtecpo:v:49:y:2015:i:3:p:415-437

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Transport Economics and Policy is currently edited by B T Bayliss, S A Morrison, A Smith and D Graham

More articles in Journal of Transport Economics and Policy from University of Bath
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().