Strategic Matching of Teachers and Schools with (and without) Accountability Pressure

Tom Ahn

Education Finance and Policy, 2017, vol. 12, issue 4, 516-535

Abstract: Accountability systems are designed to introduce market pressures to increase efficiency in education. One potential channel by which this can occur is to match with effective teachers in the transfer market. I use a smooth maximum score estimator model, North Carolina data, and the state's bonus system to analyze how teachers and schools change matching behavior in response to accountability pressure. Schools under a high degree of accountability pressure match with teachers who are better at raising test scores. Estimation with a control year sample (when pressure was absent) bolsters these findings. Accountability pressure seems to motivate schools to compete for effective teachers.

Date: 2017
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