Enacting the Rubric: Teacher Improvements in Windows of High-Stakes Observation

Aaron Phipps () and Emily A. Wiseman ()
Additional contact information
Emily A. Wiseman: Curry School of Education University of Virginia Charlottesville, VA 22904

Education Finance and Policy, 2021, vol. 16, issue 2, 283-312

Abstract: Teacher evaluation systems that use in-class observations, particularly in high-stakes settings, are frequently understood as accountability systems intended as nonintrusive measures of teacher quality. Presumably, the evaluation system motivates teachers to improve their practice—an accountability mechanism—and provides actionable feedback for improvement—an information mechanism. No evidence exists, however, establishing the causal link between an evaluation program and daily teacher practices. Importantly, it is unknown how teachers may modify their practice in the time leading up to an unannounced in-class observation, or how they integrate feedback into their practice post-evaluation, a question that fundamentally changes the design and philosophy of teacher evaluation programs. We disentangle these two effects with a unique empirical strategy that exploits random variation in the timing of in-class observations in the Washington, DC, teacher evaluation program IMPACT. Our key finding is that teachers work to improve during periods in which they are more likely to be observed, and they improve with subsequent evaluations. We interpret this as evidence that both mechanisms are at work, and as a result, policy makers should seriously consider both when designing teacher evaluation systems.

Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1162/edfp_a_00295
Access to PDF is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpr:edfpol:v:16:y:2021:i:2:p:283-312

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://mitpressjour ... rnal/?issn=1557-3060

Access Statistics for this article

Education Finance and Policy is currently edited by Stephanie Riegg Cellini and Randall Reback

More articles in Education Finance and Policy from MIT Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The MIT Press ().