The Influence of Performance-Based Accountability on the Distribution of Teacher Salary Increases
Robert Bifulco ()
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Robert Bifulco: Center for Policy Research, Syracuse University
Education Finance and Policy, 2010, vol. 5, issue 2, 177-199
Abstract:
This study examines how aspects of a district's institutional and policy environment influence the distribution of teacher salary increases. The primary hypothesis tested is that statewide performance-based accountability policies influence the extent to which districts backload teacher salary increases. I use data on teacher salaries from the National Center for Education Statistics Schools and Staffing Survey and an index of performance-based accountability to examine the relationship between accountability and backloading. Consistent with the study's hypothesis, the results indicate that strong performance-based, state-level accountability is associated with decreases in teacher salary backloading among urban districts. © 2010 American Education Finance Association
Keywords: teacher salaries; performance-based accountability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I21 I22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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