Does Divorce Law Matter?

Giulio Fella, Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2004, vol. 2, issue 4, 607-633

Abstract: In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when unconstrained transfers are possible only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates. (JEL: C78, J120) Copyright (c) 2004 The European Economic Association.

Date: 2004
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