Does Divorce Law Matter?

Giulio Fella, Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti

No 439, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates.

Keywords: divorce; non transferability; Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2002-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Published - published in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2004, 2 (4), 607-633

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Journal Article: Does Divorce Law Matter? (2004)
Working Paper: Does Divorce Law Matter? (2002)
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