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Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications

George-Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2007, vol. 5, issue 2-3, 585-593

Abstract: In recent years there has been a growing interest in macro models with heterogeneity in information and complementarity in actions. These models deliver promising positive properties, such as heightened inertia and volatility. But they also raise importantnormative questions, such as whether the heightened inertia and volatility are socially undesirable, whether there is room for policies that correct the way agents use information in equilibrium, and what are the welfare effects of the information disseminated by the media or policy makers. We argue that a key to answering all these questions is the relation between the equilibrium and the socially optimal degrees of coordination. The former summarizes the private value from aligning individual decisions, whereas the latter summarizes the value that society assigns to such an alignment once all externalities are internalized. (JEL: C72, D62, D82) (c) 2007 by the European Economic Association.

Date: 2007
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Journal of the European Economic Association is currently edited by Xavier Vives, George-Marios Angeletos, Orazio P. Attanasio, Fabio Canova and Roberto Perotti

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