Asset Auctions, Information, and Liquidity
Xavier Vives
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2010, vol. 8, issue 2-3, 467-477
Abstract:
A model is presented of a uniform price auction where bidders compete in demand schedules; the model allows for common and private values in the absence of exogenous noise. It is shown how private information yields more market power than the levels seen with full information. Results obtained here are broadly consistent with evidence from asset auctions, may help explain the response of central banks to the crisis, and suggest potential improvements in the auction formats of asset auctions. (JEL: D44, D82, G14, E58) (c) 2010 by the European Economic Association.
JEL-codes: D44 D82 E58 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Working Paper: Asset Auctions, Information, and Liquidity (2010) 
Working Paper: Asset Auctions, Information, and Liquidity (2010) 
Working Paper: Asset auctions, information and liquidity (2009) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:8:y:2010:i:2-3:p:467-477
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Journal of the European Economic Association is currently edited by Xavier Vives, George-Marios Angeletos, Orazio P. Attanasio, Fabio Canova and Roberto Perotti
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