Asset auctions, information and liquidity

Xavier Vives

No D/837, IESE Research Papers from IESE Business School

Abstract: A model is presented of a uniform price auction where bidders compete in demand schedules; the model allows for common and private values in the absence of exogenous noise. It is shown how private information yields more market power than the levels seen with full information. Results obtained here are broadly consistent with evidence from asset auctions, may help explain the response of central banks to the crisis and suggest potential improvements in the auction formats of asset auctions.

Keywords: adverse selection; market power; reverse auctions; bid shading (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 E58 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2009-12-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-fmk and nep-mst
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.iese.edu/research/pdfs/DI-0837-E.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Asset Auctions, Information, and Liquidity (2010)
Working Paper: Asset Auctions, Information, and Liquidity (2010)
Working Paper: Asset Auctions, Information, and Liquidity (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0837

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