Union-Firm Efficient Bargaining and Test of Oligopolistic Conduct
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1993, vol. 75, issue 3, 563-67
This paper applies a production function approach to the analysis of imperfection in product and factor markets and develops a test of efficient bargaining for wage and employment determination. Based on a translog function defined at the firm level, estimates for the Belgian chemical industry are consistent with the existence of product market power that is significantly eroded by union wage rents. Copyright 1993 by MIT Press.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6535%2819930 ... 0.CO%3B2-8&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
Working Paper: Union-Firm Efficient Bagainig and Test of Oligopolistic Conduct (1992)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpr:restat:v:75:y:1993:i:3:p:563-67
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://mitpressjour ... rnal/?issn=0034-6535
Access Statistics for this article
The Review of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Amitabh Chandra, Olivier Coibion, Bryan S. Graham, Shachar Kariv, Amit K. Khandelwal, Asim Ijaz Khwaja, Brigitte C. Madrian and Rohini Pande
More articles in The Review of Economics and Statistics from MIT Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ann Olson ().