Union-Firm Efficient Bagainig and Test of Oligopolistic Conduct
No 1992003, Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)
This paper applies a production function approach to the analysis of imperfections in output and factor markets and develops a test of efficient bargaining for wage and employment determination. Based on a translog function defined at the firm level, estimates for the Belgian chemical industry are consistent with the existence of output market power which is itself eroded by wage rents originating from efficient bargain.
Keywords: production; collective bargaining; wages; enterprises; trade unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Union-Firm Efficient Bargaining and Test of Oligopolistic Conduct (1993)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:1992003
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