Reducing Choice Overload without Reducing Choices
Tibor Besedes,
Cary Deck (),
Sudipta Sarangi and
Mikhael Shor
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2015, vol. 97, issue 4, 793-802
Abstract:
Previous studies have demonstrated that a multitude of options can lead to choice overload, reducing decision quality. Through controlled experiments, we examine sequential choice architectures that enable the choice set to remain large while potentially reducing the effect of choice overload. A specific tournament-style architecture achieves this goal. An alternate architecture in which subjects compare each subset of options to the most preferred option encountered thus far fails to improve performance due to the status quo bias. Subject preferences over different choice architectures are negatively correlated with performance, suggesting that providing choice over architectures might reduce the quality of decisions.
Keywords: choice architecture; choice overload; inertia; status quo bias; self-sorting; decision making; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/REST_a_00506 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpr:restat:v:97:y:2015:i:4:p:793-802
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://mitpressjour ... rnal/?issn=0034-6535
Access Statistics for this article
The Review of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Pierre Azoulay, Olivier Coibion, Will Dobbie, Raymond Fisman, Benjamin R. Handel, Brian A. Jacob, Kareen Rozen, Xiaoxia Shi, Tavneet Suri and Yi Xu
More articles in The Review of Economics and Statistics from MIT Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The MIT Press ().