Monitoring Corruption: Can Top-Down Monitoring Crowd Out Grassroots Participation?

Robert Gonzalez, Matthew Harvey and Foteini Tzachrista

Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2025, vol. 73, issue 3, 1073 - 1108

Abstract: Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of grassroots monitoring is mixed. This paper proposes a previously unexplored mechanism that may explain this result. We argue that the presence of effective top-down monitoring alternatives can undermine citizen participation in the monitoring process. Using Olken’s (2009) road-building field experiment, we find that the effect of grassroots monitoring on missing expenditures drops by more than 90% in villages where a government audit is also implemented. We find evidence of crowding-out effects: in audit villages, individuals are less likely to attend, talk at, and actively participate in accountability meetings.

Date: 2025
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