When Money Can’t Buy Political Love: Lab Experiments on Vote Buying in Ghana and Uganda

Dominic Burbidge, Nic Cheeseman and Amma Panin

Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2025, vol. 73, issue 4, 1923 - 1943

Abstract: Citizens who reject bribery in the context of democratic political processes might view the exchange of money for votes as illegitimate, even if they enjoy reciprocal relationships with politicians in other contexts. We test this by using lab-in-the-field experiments in Ghana and Uganda. Participants play the roles of voters and of candidates who have opportunities to bribe. Voters are more likely to vote for a candidate who had the opportunity to bribe but refrained from doing so. Respondents who have had positive experiences of elections were more likely to reward nonbribing candidates. These findings suggest that the lab-in-the-field results are best explained by democratic values among some respondents.

Date: 2025
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