Strategic Behavior and Marriage Payments: Theory and Evidence from Senegal
Frédéric Gaspart () and
Jean-Philippe Platteau ()
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2010, vol. 59, issue 1, 149-185
This article proposes an original theory of marriage payments based on insights gained from firsthand information collected in the Senegal River valley. This theory postulates that decisions about the bride-price, which are made by the bride's father, take into account the likely effects of the amount set on the risk of ill-treatment of the wife and the risk of marriage failure. Based on a sequential game with three players (the bride's father, the husband, and the wife) and a matching process, it leads to a number of important predictions that are tested against Senegalese data relating to bride-prices and various characteristics of women. The empirical results confirm that parents behave strategically by keeping bride-prices down so as to reduce the risk of marriage failure for their daughters. Other interesting effects on marriage payments and the probability of separation are also highlighted, stressing the role of the bride's bargaining power in her own family. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/655457 link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:ecdecc:v:59:y:2010:i:1:p:149-185
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Economic Development and Cultural Change from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().