What Have We Learned from Market Design?

Alvin Roth

Innovation Policy and the Economy, 2009, vol. 9, issue 1, 79 - 112

Abstract: This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, that is, they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in the market; they have to overcome the congestion that thickness can bring, by making it possible to consider enough alternative transactions to arrive at good ones; and they need to make it safe and sufficiently simple to participate in the market, as opposed to transacting outside of the market or having to engage in costly and risky strategic behavior. I will draw on recent examples of market design ranging from labor markets for doctors and new economists to kidney exchange and school choice in New York City and Boston.

Date: 2009
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Related works:
Chapter: What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2009)
Journal Article: What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)
Journal Article: What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)
Journal Article: What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)
Working Paper: What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)
Working Paper: What Have We Learned From Market Design? (2007)
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