Information Scripts and the Incentive Compatibility of Discrete Choice Experiments

Christian Vossler, David A. Keiser, Catherine L. Kling and Daniel J. Phaneuf

Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 2025, vol. 12, issue 2, 459 - 492

Abstract: This study examines whether information scripts can align respondent beliefs with theory assumptions required for truthful demand revelation in stated preference surveys. We embed tests of these scripts within a discrete choice experiment of large-scale surface water quality improvements in the midwestern United States. An independence script, which encourages respondents to treat the multiple valuation scenarios presented to them in isolation, improves construct validity and increases the likelihood that stated beliefs are congruent with multiple, theory-relevant assumptions. There are positive spatial scope effects in willingness to pay for those receiving the script and negative scope effects, which we ascribe to strategic voting, for those that do not. Two payment scripts, hypothesized to enhance adherence to the payment mechanism, have an insignificant effect on stated beliefs. A payment script which implies that a household’s income and the cost of the policy are linked, however, appears to contribute to the finding of negative scope effects.

Date: 2025
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