Group Size and Threshold Uncertainty in Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas

Philip Brookins and Weston Watts

Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 2025, vol. 12, issue 6, 1527 - 1561

Abstract: We analyze a generalized common-pool resource dilemma game under group size and threshold uncertainty. The number of active players and the size of the resource are random variables. Active players choose an amount of the resource to request. If total requests do not exceed the realized resource size, then players receive utility equal to their request; otherwise, they receive zero utility. The introduction of group size uncertainty makes the traditional analysis intractable. We exploit the mixed continuous/discrete nature of the game to obtain the set of potential equilibria, of which only a subset are equilibria in the Nash sense. We compare our predictions to the data of two experimental studies ex post. Predictions are not supported by the data, which is mostly attributed to pessimistic behavior not accounted for in the model. Our analyses help us better understand appropriation behavior in natural resources under environmental uncertainty.

Date: 2025
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