Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions: Reply to Priest
Alvin Roth ()
Journal of Labor Economics, 2012, vol. 30, issue 2, 479 - 494
In this reply I describe the unraveling of transaction dates in several markets, including the labor market for new lawyers hired by large law firms. This and other markets illustrate that unraveling can occur in markets with competitive prices, that it can result in substantial inefficiencies, and that marketplace institutions play a role in restoring efficiency. All of these contradict the conclusions of Priest.
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