Professionalism and Contracts in Organizations

Canice Prendergast

Journal of Labor Economics, 2015, vol. 33, issue 3, 591 - 621

Abstract: Employees in public agencies rarely have pay for performance: instead their incentives are often guided by a sense of professionalism. This paper concerns how organizations should monitor professionals. The primary outcome of the paper is that weak incentives lead public agencies to exhibit bias in their oversight, by rewarding the interests of their employees to the detriment of other constituencies' concerns. In some instances, this bias is complete by entirely ignoring other interests.

Date: 2015
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