How Do Employers Use Compensation History? Evidence from a Field Experiment
Moshe A. Barach and
John J. Horton
Journal of Labor Economics, 2021, vol. 39, issue 1, 193 - 218
We report the results of a field experiment in which treated employers could not observe the compensation history of their job applicants. Treated employers responded by evaluating more applicants and evaluating those applicants more intensively. They also responded by changing what kind of workers they evaluated: treated employers evaluated workers with 5% lower past average wages and hired workers with 13% lower past average wages. Conditional on bargaining, workers hired by treated employers struck better wage bargains for themselves.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/709277
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Labor Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().