External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion

William Chan

Journal of Labor Economics, 1996, vol. 14, issue 4, 555-70

Abstract: This article analyzes the choice between internal promotion and external recruitment within the framework of an economic contest. Opening up the competition for a position to external candidates reduces the chance of promotion for existing workers and, therefore, their incentive to work. Increasing the prize for winning can maintain incentives but is limited by moral hazard and potentially disruptive office politics. Alternatively, a competitive handicap can be awarded to existing workers to boost their chances. This strategy is consistent with the general observation that an external candidate is recruited only if she is significantly superior to the internal contestants. Copyright 1996 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1996
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