Team Human Capital and Worker Mobility

Ottorino Chillemi and Benedetto Gui ()

Journal of Labor Economics, 1997, vol. 15, issue 4, 567-85

Abstract: The authors discuss the concept of 'team human capital' and study the renegotiation of labor compensation after team members privately observe their own reservation wage. As labor productivity can only be high if the number of quits does not exceed a threshold, decisions concerning acceptance of individual wage demands become interdependent. When a team is made up of salaried workers, a peculiar case of efficiency wage results. Moreover, inefficient team dissolution may occur. The authors then show that inefficiency is less likely to occur when team members form a partnership. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1997
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