Beauty, Productivity, and Discrimination: Lawyers' Looks and Lucre

Jeff Biddle and Daniel Hamermesh

Journal of Labor Economics, 1998, vol. 16, issue 1, 172-201

Abstract: The authors propose models with an ascriptive characteristic generating earnings differentials and causing sectoral sorting, allowing them to distinguish among sources producing such differentials. They use longitudinal data on a large sample of graduates from one law school and measure beauty by rating matriculation photographs. Better-looking attorneys who graduated in the 1970s earned more than others after five years of practice, an effect that grew with experience. Attorneys in the private sector are better-looking than those in the public sector, differences that rise with age. These results support theories of dynamic sorting and customer behavior. Copyright 1998 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1998
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Working Paper: Beauty, Productivity and Discrimination: Lawyers' Looks and Lucre (1995)
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