Strategic Delegation and Delay in Negotiations over the Bargaining Agenda
Michael Conlin () and
Taiji Furusawa ()
Journal of Labor Economics, 2000, vol. 18, issue 1, 55-73
This paper develops a game-theoretic model that endogenizes the items included in the bargaining agenda. The model's equilibria suggest two possible sources of inefficiency: (1) exclusion of items from the bargaining agenda and (2) delay to agreement due to negotiations over the bargaining agenda. Evidence from union contract negotiations is provided to demonstrate the relevance of these sources of inefficiency. The model also allows strategic delegation by the union. In certain equilibria, the surplus-maximizing union selects wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members) to negotiate the contract. Copyright 2000 by University of Chicago Press.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/209950 full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. See http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE for details.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:18:y:2000:i:1:p:55-73
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Labor Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().