Good Jobs versus Bad Jobs

Daron Acemoglu

Journal of Labor Economics, 2001, vol. 19, issue 1, 1-21

Abstract: This article develops a model of noncompetitive labor markets in which high-wage (good) and low-wage (bad) jobs coexist. Minimum wages and unemployment benefits shift the composition of employment toward high-wage jobs. Because the composition of jobs in the laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficiently biased toward low-wage jobs, these labor market regulations increase average labor productivity and may improve welfare. Copyright 2001 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 2001
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