Career Concerns in Teams

Emmanuelle Auriol, Guido Friebel () and Lambros Pechlivanos ()

Journal of Labor Economics, 2002, vol. 20, issue 2, 289-307

Abstract: We investigate how changes in the commitment power of a principal affect cooperation among agents who work in a team. When the principal and her agents are symmetrically uncertain about the agents' innate abilities, workers have career concerns. Then, unless the principal can commit herself to long-term wage contracts, an implicit sabotage incentive emerges. Agents become reluctant to help their teammates. Anticipating this risk, and in order to induce the desired level of cooperation, the principal offers more collectively oriented incentive schemes. Temporary workers, though, are not affected by the sabotage effect, and their incentives are more individually oriented.

Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (60)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/338240 main text (application/pdf)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:20:y:2002:i:2:p:289-307

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Labor Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().