Job Displacement, Disability, and Divorce

Kerwin Kofi Charles and Melvin Stephens
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Kerwin Kofi Charles: University of Michigan and National Bureau of Economic Research

Journal of Labor Economics, 2004, vol. 22, issue 2, 489-522

Abstract: Earnings shocks should affect divorce probability by changing a couple's expected gains from marriage. We find that the divorce hazard rises after a spouse's job displacement but does not change after a spousal disability. This difference casts doubt on a purely pecuniary motivation for divorce following earnings shocks, since both types of shocks exhibit similar long-run economic consequences. Furthermore, the increase in divorce is found only for layoffs and not for plant closings, suggesting that information conveyed about a partner's noneconomic suitability as a mate due to a job loss may be more important than financial losses in precipitating divorce.

Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Job Displacement, Disability, and Divorce (2001)
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