Delays in Renewal of Labor Contracts: Theory and Evidence

Leif Danziger () and Shoshana Neuman ()

Journal of Labor Economics, 2005, vol. 23, issue 2, 341-372

Abstract: In many countries, an expired labor contract is automatically extended during the often-protracted delay before the new contract is signed. Our theoretical model focuses on macroeconomic factors in explaining the delay. It emphasizes the importance of the realized nominal and real shocks, and of the levels of nominal and real uncertainty. The model is tested using Israeli collective wage agreements where long delays are frequent. The empirical findings strongly support the theoretical model. Thus, nominal uncertainty is found to increase the delay, and real uncertainty to decrease the delay, but less in the public than in the private sector.

Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/428027 main text (application/pdf)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
Working Paper: Delays in Renewal of Labor Contracts: Theory and Evidence (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:23:y:2005:i:2:p:341-372

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Labor Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().