Optimal Immigration and Cultural Assimilation

István Kónya

Journal of Labor Economics, 2007, vol. 25, issue 2, 367-391

Abstract: This article develops a model that examines the role of cultural conflict in immigration and immigration policy. Cultural differences lead to frictions between natives and immigrants unless the latter make a costly investment to assimilate. This article’s key contribution is the joint analysis of the assimilation and migration decisions, which highlights the inefficiency of some commonly advocated policy tools to achieve the first best. U.S. data provide preliminary support for the model’s implications.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:25:y:2007:p:367-391

DOI: 10.1086/511378

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