Worker Reputation and Productivity Incentives

Debra J Aron

Journal of Labor Economics, 1987, vol. 5, issue 4, S87-106

Abstract: This paper examines firms' problems of how to motivate risk-averse workers not to shirk whe n workers' utility functions are unknown. The problem is studied in a two-period setting in which a worker's actions today can influence n ot only his compensation today but the firms' beliefs about his prefe rences. Firms cannot credibly commit to ignore the revealed informati on, so workers' actions today affect their future compensation contra cts. It is shown that, in the Wilson-Miyazaki equilibrium, firms may pool workers and learn about their types gradually over time rather t han inducing them to separate and reveal their types immediately. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1987
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