Marital Division of Labor with Risk of Divorce: The Role of "Voice" Enforcement of Contracts

Kjell Lommerud ()

Journal of Labor Economics, 1989, vol. 7, issue 1, 113-27

Abstract: It is assumed that emotional ties can be relied on to enforce impli cit marital contracts by "voice." Therefore, in the present model, divorc e has economic consequences not only because the economies of scale from living together are destroyed but also because the scope for suc h "voice" enforcement is weakened. Moreover, perhaps surprisingly, the author finds that it is ambiguous how an increase in the probability of divorce influences predivorce allocation of time, even when preferences are assumed to be homothetic. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1989
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