Bargaining and the Joint-Cost Theory of Strikes: An Experimental Study

Barry Sopher

Journal of Labor Economics, 1990, vol. 8, issue 1, 48-74

Abstract: This article reports on an experiment that is designed to test predictions about the frequency of disagreement (strikes) in games with complete information. An empirical test of the "joint-cost" theory, which relates strike activity to the marginal cost of striking, is based on a set of "shrinking pie" games in which subjects bargain in consecutive periods over how to divide a sum of money. Strike activity is a frequent occurrence in these games and, moreover, does not disappear over time. The joint-cost theory receive some support, indicating that further tests may be useful. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1990
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