Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs

Jason R Barro and Robert Barro

Journal of Labor Economics, 1990, vol. 8, issue 4, 448-81

Abstract: A new data set covers chief executive officers (CEOs) of large commercial banks over the period 1982-87. For newly hired CEOs, the elasticity of pay with respect to assets is about one-third. For continuing CEOs, the change in compensation depends on performance, as measured by stock and accounting returns. The sensitivity of pay to performance diminishes with experience, but the returns are not filtered for peer-group returns. Logit regressions relate the probability of CEO departure to age and performance, as measured by stock returns filtered for peer-group returns; CEO experience does not influence this relationship. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1990
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Working Paper: Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs (1990)
Working Paper: Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs (1990)
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