Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services

Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston and Andrzej Skrzypacz

Journal of Law and Economics, 2011, vol. 54, issue S4, S167 - S188

Abstract: Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction but also in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments that regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.

Date: 2011
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Working Paper: Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (2012)
Working Paper: Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (2011)
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