Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services
Peter Cramton (),
Gregory Rosston () and
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Evan Kwerel: Stanford University
Gregory Rosston: Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research, Stanford University
No 10-015, Discussion Papers from Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.
Keywords: auctions; spectrum auctions; market design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 C78 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (2012)
Journal Article: Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sip:dpaper:10-015
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