Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services

Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston () and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Additional contact information
Evan Kwerel: Stanford University
Gregory Rosston: Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research, Stanford University

No 10-015, Discussion Papers from Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.

Keywords: auctions; spectrum auctions; market design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/repec/sip/10-015.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (2012)
Journal Article: Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sip:dpaper:10-015

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