Media versus Special Interests

Alexander Dyck, David Moss and Luigi Zingales

Journal of Law and Economics, 2013, vol. 56, issue 3, 521 - 553

Abstract: We argue that profit-maximizing media help to overcome the rational ignorance problem highlighted by Anthony Downs. By collecting news and combining it with entertainment, media are able to inform passive voters about regulation and other public policy issues, acting as a (partial) counterbalance to small but well-organized groups. To show the impact this information has on regulation, we document the effect muckraking magazines had on the voting patterns of U.S. representatives and senators on regulatory issues in the early part of the twentieth century. We also discuss the conditions under which media can serve to counterbalance special interests.

Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/673216 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/673216 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
Working Paper: Media versus Special Interests (2008)
Working Paper: Media versus Special Interests (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/673216

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Law and Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().