Media versus Special Interests

Isaac Dyck, David Moss and Luigi Zingales

No 14360, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We argue that profit-maximizing media help overcome the problem of "rational ignorance" highlighted by Downs (1957) and in so doing make elected representatives more sensitive to the interests of general voters. By collecting news and combining it with entertainment, media are able to inform passive voters on politically relevant issues. To show the impact this information has on legislative outcomes, we document the effect "muckraking" magazines had on the voting patterns of U.S. representatives and senators in the early part of the 20th century. We also show under what conditions profit-maximizing media will cater to general (less affluent) voters in their coverage, providing a counterbalance to special interests.

JEL-codes: L51 N41 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cul and nep-pol
Note: POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Published as Alexander Dyck & David Moss & Luigi Zingales, 2013. "Media versus Special Interests," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(3), pages 521 - 553.

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Working Paper: Media versus Special Interests (2008)
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