Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors

Josh Lerner

Journal of Law and Economics, 1995, vol. 38, issue 2, 463-95

Abstract: This article empirically examines the patenting behavior of new biotechnology firms that have different litigation costs. I show that firms with high litigation costs are less likely to patent in subclasses with many other awards, particularly those of firms with low litigation costs. This pattern is consistent with the literature on costly litigation, which suggests that firms that have high litigation costs will take greater precautions to avoid litigation. These results are robust to a variety of control variables and modifications that seek to test alternative explanations. Copyright 1995 by the University of Chicago.

Date: 1995
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (212)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467339 (application/pdf)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:38:y:1995:i:2:p:463-95

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Law and Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division (pubtech@press.uchicago.edu).