EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Fairness in an Embedded Ultimatum Game

Paul Pecorino () and Mark Van Boening

Journal of Law and Economics, 2010, vol. 53, issue 2, 263-287

Abstract: We embed an ultimatum game in a stylized legal bargaining framework. This changes the framing of the standard ultimatum game in several ways but also moves the bargaining closer to what is found in some naturally occurring settings. In this context, the ultimatum game is played over the joint surplus, which is achieved from settlement rather than a dispute. In our embedded ultimatum game, the median offer contains only 8 percent of the joint surplus from settlement. When we replicate the simple ultimatum game, we find that 50 percent of the joint surplus is contained in the median offer. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/599622 link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:53:y:2010:i:2:p:263-287

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Law and Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().

 
Page updated 2020-05-20
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:53:y:2010:i:2:p:263-287